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Finance and Social Responsibility in the Informal Economy:   
Institutional Voids, Globalization and Microfinance Institutions 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
We examine the heterogeneous effects of globalization on the interest rate setting by microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) around the world. We consider MFIs as a mechanism to overcome the institutional 
void of credit for small entrepreneurs in developing and emerging economies. Using a large global 
panel of MFIs from 119 countries, we find that social globalization that embraces egalitarian 
institutions on average reduces MFIs’ interest rates. In contrast, economic globalization that embraces 
neoliberal institutions on average increases MFIs’ interest rates. Moreover, the proportions of female 
borrowers and of poorer borrowers negatively moderate the relationship between social globalization 
and MFI interest rate, and positively moderate the relationship between economic globalization and 
MFI interest rate. This paper contributes to understanding how globalization processes can both 
ameliorate and exacerbate challenges of institutional voids in emerging and developing economies. 
 
Keywords: Institutional voids, microfinance institutions, economic globalization, social globalization   
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Finance and Social Responsibility in the Informal Economy:   
Institutional Voids, Globalization and Microfinance Institutions 
 
Small- and medium-sized enterprises and entrepreneurs around the world frequently face “institutional 
voids” of credit, that is, in many places there are systematic constraints to obtaining credit stemming 
from underdeveloped capital and intermediary markets, regulatory systems, contract-enforcing 
mechanisms and weak or even absent institutional arrangements that support these markets (Khanna & 
Palepu, 1997; Mair & Marti, 2009). In many countries, microfinance institutions (MFIs) have emerged 
as an important mechanism to overcome such voids by providing small and low-interest loans to 
low-income individuals for them to establish small businesses (Chakrabarty & Bass, 2013; Sun & Im, 
2015; Yunus, 2007). Yet, despite the vast literature on the effects of MFIs in facilitating the 
development of SMEs and small entrepreneurs (e.g. Morduch, 1999; Barr, 2005; Chakrabarty & Bass, 
2013, 2014a, 2014b; Cull, Demirguc-Kunt, & Morduch, 2007), to date, little is known on how 
variation in institutional context shapes the extent to which MFIs are effective in bridging these voids 
(Ault & Spicer, 2013): What kind of institutions support MFIs to help more poor people escape 
poverty? How does the institutional context shape MFIs’ responses to institutional voids in an 
increasingly globalized world? 
We examine these questions by studying the effect of globalization on MFI operations across 
developing and emerging economies. The literature on globalization is mixed on the extent to which 
globalization would ameliorate or exacerbate problems stemming from institutional voids and so affect 
the operation of MFIs. Positive views on the effects of globalization argue that globalization greatly 
facilitates trade and information exchange by lowering the restrictions of capital and flow of  
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information, which fuels economic growth. In addition, it helps spread egalitarian institutions around 
the world (Dreher, 2006). The negative view argues that much of the benefits brought by 
neoliberal-based globalization are enjoyed by developed countries and the formal sectors, while 
developing countries and the poor population actually suffer from it due to increased competition and 
income gaps between the rich and the poor (Stiglitz, 2002; Rodrik, 2006). These different effects of 
globalization could interact with institutional voids to influence organizational strategies and change 
processes that aim to overcome these voids. For example, globalization that is related to more 
egalitarian institutions helps reduce the huge information asymmetry between organizations and their 
stakeholders (e.g., customers and suppliers) that are created by institutional voids, thus significantly 
increase the bargaining power of the vulnerable and disadvantaged in societies. On the contrary, 
globalization that is related to more competitive institutions may amplify such asymmetry of 
information and bargaining power between the advantaged and disadvantaged. 
To better identify and understand effects of globalization on how organizations such as MFIs 
bridge institutional voids, we unpack the multi-dimensional nature of globalization (Brady, Beckfield, 
& Seeleib-Kaiser, 2005, Stiglitz, 2002). Social globalization embraces more egalitarian institutions 
and is associated with the spread of ideas, information, images, and people (Norris, 2000; Dreher, 
2006), which help alleviate problems with institutional voids, such as information asymmetry and 
stereotype. In contrast, economic globalization typically embraces neoliberal economic policies such 
as facilitating international trade, FDI, portfolio investment, and removal of trade restrictions such as 
tariffs, capital account restriction and hidden import barriers. Such classification allows us to 
disentangle its heterogeneous effects on organizational behavior such as that of MFIs in the informal 
economy. The informal sector served by MFIs is arguably more sensitive to the heterogeneous effects  
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of globalization, given its large population and fragile nature (Armendáriz de Aghion & Morduch, 
2005). How globalization influences MFIs’ willingness and capability to overcome institutional voids, 
and how globalization processes and MFIs interact with each other in helping the poor, are the foci of 
our study. 
A key outcome to understand MFI operation and effectiveness is the interest rates they charge 
their customers. For small entrepreneurs, lower costs of borrowing from MFIs gives informal 
entrepreneurs easier financing, thus makes it easier for their businesses to operate and survive, which 
further leads to better development of the informal sector and thus more inclusive growth in the 
society (Bruton, Khavul, & Chavez, 2011, Robinson, 2001). That is, interest rate setting largely 
manifests MFIs’ social responsibility in caring about the welfare of poor borrowers across countries 
informal economies (Sun & Im, 2015). Therefore, we focus on the heterogeneous effects of 
globalization on MFIs’ micro-credit loan interest rates to small entrepreneurs. If globalization can 
benefit SMEs and small entrepreneurs, it would help to reduce the barrier of informal entrepreneurs’ 
access to finance (lower microfinance interest rates). However, if globalization has negative effects on 
SMEs and small entrepreneurs, it would make their access to finance even more difficult (higher 
microfinance interest rates).   
Our paper is distinguished from—and contributes to—the existing literature in at least two central 
ways. At a basic level, our paper contributes to understanding of the dynamics of institutional voids in 
emerging economies. The conventional wisdom holds that inclusive growth is fueled by inclusive 
institutions, which constrain the elite and protects property rights (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). 
However, as we show in this paper, different types of institutions introduced by globalization can 
affect organizational behavior in different ways, thus have different implications for social welfare.  
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Second, at the organizational level, our paper contributes empirically to the recent resurgence of 
academic attention on social enterprises and hybrid organizations (Battilana & Lee, 2014). Social 
enterprises such as MFIs are emblematic of economy-wide increases in activity at the interface 
between business and charity, as corporations increasingly engage in social responsibility-related 
activities, and non-profits increasingly engage in commercial activities to complement their primary, 
philanthropic sources of funding (Battliana & Dorado, 2010; Battilana et al., 2012). Our findings about 
MFIs strategies therefore shed light on how hybrid organizations in the informal economy operate to 
balance their social mission with financial profitability.   
 
MICROFINANCE IN DEVELOPING AND EMERGING ECONOMIES 
Microfinance is traditionally defined as small loans delivered to low-income entrepreneurs to support 
business expansion and growth (Ault & Spicer, 2013; Robinson, 2001; Yunus, 2007). Microfinance 
has been considered as a tool to address poverty and foster “inclusive growth” by extending financial 
services to impoverished populations in the informal economy (Van Sandt & Sud, 2012; Zhao & Wry, 
2014). The rationale is that individuals have the potential to break out of poverty when they have 
access to loans that enable them to start and grow small businesses – microcredit allows individuals to 
smooth cash flows, manage risk, cope with economic shocks, and purchase more productive assets, 
which, in turn, fosters entrepreneurship that has been tied to numerous positive economic and social 
outcomes (Armedariz de Aghion & Morduch, 2010; Ault & Spicer, 2013).   
The preponderance of research on MFIs is from economic and finance perspectives. For example, 
researchers have studied the determinants of the individual microfinance loans, which primarily focus 
on borrowers’ characteristics, such as the poor’s credit worthiness (Johnson & Morduch, 2008), peer  
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screening (Michels, 2012), monitoring (Karlan, 2007), and joint liability (Ahlin & Townsend, 2007). 
Others have studied the economic consequences of MFIs, such as poverty reduction (Khandker, 2005) 
and entrepreneurship (Bruton, Khavul, & Chavez, 2011). Recently, some scholars have taken the 
lender’s perspective and investigated how microfinance loans are influenced by MFIs organizational 
characteristics. This line of research usually applies agency theory to the relationship between MFIs’ 
ownership and profitability (Mersland & Strom, 2008), outreach and financial sustainability 
(Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2007; Im & Sun, 2014; Quayes, 2011), corporate governance (Mersland & 
Strom, 2009; Charkrabarty & Bass, 2014), and cost efficiency (Caudill, Gropper, & Hartarska, 2009). 
  While many studies have focused on economic dimensions of micro-credit, less considered is the 
“hybrid” nature of these organizations. That is, MFIs are social enterprises that on one hand pursue a 
social mission—helping the poor—while on the other hand engage in commercial activities that 
sustain their operations (Im & Sun, 2014; Mair, 2010). On the social side, MFIs serve the poorest tier 
of the world’s economic pyramid, which comprises more than four billion people, or around 65 
percent of the world’s population, who earn less than $3,000 each per year (Charkrabarty & Bass, 
2013). In this regard, evidence suggests that microfinance positively affects social outcomes such as 
women’s empowerment, social capital, and economic conditions (Zhao & Wry, 2014). On the 
commercial side, most MFIs worldwide face the challenge of making sufficient profit to breakeven, 
and frequently have to raise fees, which undermines their social mission of helping the poor (Cull, 
Demirguc-Kunt, & Morduch, 2007). MFIs’ sustainability as “hybrid organizations” thus depends both 
on the advancement of their social mission and on their commercial performance (Battliana & Dorado, 
2010; Battilana & Lee, 2014; Mair, 2010). 
Recent recent studies have begun investigating the challenges of scaling while fulfilling social  
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mission, finding that, achieving this hybrid ideal is frequently constrained by institutional handicaps. 
For example, Ault & Spicer (2013) show how “state fragility” (the failure of the state to act in the 
public interest) can thwart MFIs’ growth, examining several indicators from the World Bank, such as 
voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, 
and corruption control. Zhao & Wry (2014) find that patriarchy norms can suppress the founding of 
MFIs and their outreach to women, and neoliberal economic policies on one hand attenuate the 
patriarchal barriers to MFIs’ founding, but on the other hand amplify such suppression to women’s 
lending. These few studies have mainly taken a static view on the institutional determinants of 
cross-country variation in MFIs’ lending, and don’t address the dynamics of such institutional 
effects—especially MFIs’ interactions with changing institutions—in an increasingly globalizing 
world. In our study, we expand the scope of how institutional contexts affect MFIs, and social 
enterprises in general, by focusing on the effects of globalization that bring heterogeneous institutions 
into developing and emerging economies. 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
The theory and hypotheses we develop below concern the direct impact of different types of 
globalization on MFIs’ interest rate setting and how these effects are moderated by characteristics of 
the MFI. As we elaborate, social globalization that is related to more egalitarian institutions helps 
reduce the information asymmetry between organizations and their stakeholders (e.g., customers and 
suppliers) that are created by institutional voids, thus significantly increasing the bargaining power of 
vulnerable and disadvantaged populations and so leading to a positive relationship between social 
globalization and MFI interest rate. In contrast, globalization that is based on neoliberal institutions 
tends to increase competition among organizations thus altering industry structure and dynamics that  
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are created by institutional voids, which can lead to further expansion of the income gap between the 
economically advantaged and disadvantaged stakeholders, thus further suppress the disadvantaged. 
These processes then lead to a negative relationship between economic globalization and MFI interest 
rate. Secondly, if these baseline hypotheses are true, it would also imply that less educated and less 
productive people are less likely to benefit from social globalization, and more likely to be deprived 
by the economic globalization. Therefore, we also investigate how those “more likely to be deprived” 
population—female borrowers and the very poor borrowers—moderate the heterogeneous impact of 
globalization on MFIs’ interest rate setting. 
Heterogeneous Effects of Globalization and Institutional Voids 
Globalization that embraces more egalitarian institutions can facilitate information flow, help to reduce 
information asymmetry and encourage risk sharing (Stiglitz, 1990; 2002). Social change in the form of 
social globalization creates instrumental, relational, and moral motives for organizations to be more 
socially responsible through increasing social cohesion and collective responsibility (Aguilera, Rupp, 
Williams, & Ganapathi, 2008). These processes are consistent with the egalitarian doctrines that 
advocate equality for all people and removal of economic inequality across countries and economies 
(both formal and informal), and information and ideas should be freely shared among all countries 
(Norris, 2000). 
Informal entrepreneurs are typically uneducated, and lack the knowledge, financial literacy and 
bargaining power to secure low-interest loans and engage in profitable activities as entrepreneurs in 
the formal sector do (Armendáriz de Aghion & Morduch, 2005; Webb, Tihanyi, Ireland, & Sirmon, 
2009). Social globalization, by facilitating information sharing and personal contact reduces 
information asymmetry, can make those uneducated entrepreneurs more knowledgeable and more  
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financially literate, and harmonize the informational and knowledge gap between formal and informal 
entrepreneurs. Consequently, informal entrepreneurs have more bargaining power with MFIs, and 
MFIs face less information asymmetry from informal entrepreneurs (Cull, Demirguc-Kunt, & 
Morduch, 2007; Stiglitz, 1990). In addition, social globalization also helps to fuel social movements 
by social activists and NGOs, which are strong supporters of egalitarianism, e.g., the development of 
Fair Trade (Levy, 2008). All these help blur the informational boundaries between the formal sector 
and the informal sector regarding entrepreneurs’ quality of running business and ability of debt 
repayment, thus release MFIs’ concern on default and lower the barrier of informal entrepreneurs’ 
access to micro-credit. Therefore, 
H1a. Social globalization reduces MFIs’ average loan portfolio interest rates. 
In contrast, economic globalization embraces neoliberal policies that facilitates competition 
across countries and sectors, which gives formal economy actors and formal entrepreneurs more 
options in the competition for resources. This increases the gap between formal entrepreneurs and 
informal entrepreneurs in terms of productivity, efficiency, and income (Stiglitz, 2002). In more 
extreme cases, the force of economic globalization can destroy existing institutions and introduce 
neoliberal-based institutions which are incompatible with the economic conditions in the informal 
economy (Bae & Rowley, 2001, Levy, 2008). From a more micro perspective, neoliberal economic 
institutions that increase productivity and the income gap can increase the information asymmetry 
between borrowers (e.g., informal entrepreneurs) and lenders (e.g., MFIs). Consequently, MFIs may 
have greater incentives to raise the cost of borrowing so as to compensate for such increased 
information asymmetry. In addition, the interest yields of the small amounts of loans granted to the 
very poor customers by MFIs are more difficult to cover the costs associated with administration and  
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monitoring under stronger competition, given the current business models and fee structures of most 
MFIs (Johnston & Morduch, 2008, Mersland & Strøm, 2010). 
The changing economic fundamentals due to economic globalization can further intensify the 
aforementioned tensions between MFIs and borrowers. On the MFI side, while they may still have a 
social mission, the increasing competition and income gap would strengthen MFIs’ economic 
orientation, thus they have stronger motivation to pursue economic profit—more similar to other 
typical commercial organizations—in relation to social responsibility. On the borrowers’ side, the 
productivity and income gap usually prevent poor borrowers in the informal economy from 
transforming to more skilled, more educated workers and entrepreneurs (La Porta & Shleifer, 2014), 
which further raise the barrier of their access to other sources of finance, thus making them heavily 
rely on obtaining financing from MFIs (Epstein & Smith, 2007). Taken together, MFIs’ social 
responsibility of overcoming institutional voids by providing low-interest micro-credit can be 
undermined by the heightening competition and income gap brought by economic globalization. 
Therefore,   
H1b. Economic globalization increases MFIs’ average loan portfolio interest rates. 
The Moderating Effect of Female Borrower Rate 
It is widely recognized that one of the most important missions of MFIs is to empower women by 
granting more low-interest loans to them (Yunus, 2007; Yunus, Moingeon, & Lehmann-Ortega, 2010). 
However, in reality, women are usually deprived from low-interest loans due to their vulnerability to 
income shocks and higher likelihood of default (Sun & Im, 2015). Many have argued that 
globalization helps to mitigate such concerns because globalization can (1) promote gender equality; 
(2) promote female education; (3) increase job opportunities for women (Cheston & Kuhn, 2002;  
 
11
Milgram, 2001). All these effects empower women by reducing their vulnerability and likelihood of 
default. In contrast, the opponents of globalization argue that globalization can also adversely affect 
women, such as increasing forced labor, trafficking, and disproportionate loss of opportunity relative 
to their male counterparts. Such processes may also reflect the inadequacies of domestic institutions 
and policies of governments (Johnson & Kidder, 1999; Milgram, 2001).   
Although social globalization reduces information asymmetry and cultural barriers and embraces 
egalitarianism, its benefits to the poor may still differ across different types of borrowers. In terms of 
gender difference, female borrowers are often perceived to be less educated, less productive, and less 
skilled than men in low-income countries. Although social globalization helps to promote education 
and financial literacy for both genders, women usually improve less than men (Milgram, 2001; Sun & 
Im, 2015), and their access to finance is more likely to be suppressed. Extending this logic to the 
context of borrowing from MFIs, women benefit less from social globalization than men in terms of 
reduced costs of borrowing (accessing to micro-credit), because women have less personal contact, 
lower productivity, and so it would have less an effect on their information asymmetry (Bruton et al., 
2011; Cull et al., 2007). In other words, men gain more bargaining power from social globalization 
than women. 
Overall, the reduction of barrier to access to finance brought by social globalization is likely to be 
attenuated by dedication to women borrowers. That is, the more dedicated to female lending the MFI 
is, the less likely it will take benefits from social globalization and cut interest rates for borrowers. 
Therefore, 
H2a. The female borrower rate of the MFI negatively moderates the relationship in H1a. 
We believe that economic globalization is also likely to have different effects on female and male  
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borrowers’ access to finance in informal economy. On one hand, the positive view of economic 
globalization suggests that low-income countries have a comparative advantage in labor-intensive 
productions (mostly low-skilled labors); where women are low skilled, they therefore gain from more 
neoliberal institutions such as freer trade. On the other hand, the negative view may suggest that 
high-skilled workers benefit when globalization results in a transfer of technology to low-wage 
countries; where women are less skilled than men, they are also likely to suffer more than men from 
the negative effects of globalization (Cheston & Kuhn, 2002). In the context of economic globalization, 
which has been hypothesized to suppress entrepreneurs in the informal sector, neoliberal institutions 
can actually amplify MFIs’ suppression of women’s lending (Zhao & Wry, 2014). Moreover, increased 
international trade and foreign investment leads to increased competition, which further increases 
income inequality between men and women at the bottom of pyramid. That is to say, economic 
globalization can actually worsen females’ access to low-interest loans by inducing competition and 
increasing the income-gap between men and women. 
Overall, the above arguments suggest that the increase of barrier to access to finance brought by 
economic globalization can be exaggerated by dedication to women borrowers. The more dedicated to 
female lending the MFI is, the stronger the effect of economic globalization on MFI’s interest rate is. 
Therefore, 
H2b: The female borrower rate of the MFI positively moderates the relationship in H1b. 
The Moderating Effect of Poorer Borrowers 
We next look at another important aspect of microfinance lending, namely the amount granted to the 
very poor borrowers, and how it moderates the effects of social and economic globalization on interest 
rate setting. Of course most entrepreneurs borrowing from MFIs are poor compared to those in the  
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formal sector, but some are much poorer than others, and their micro-credit loan amounts are much 
smaller. We believe that, similar to female borrowers, poorer borrowers are also likely to benefit less 
or are deprived more from the heterogeneous effects of globalization. To investigate such effects, we 
focus on the average amount of loan balance per borrower that the MFI serves. Smaller average 
amount of loans per borrower indicates that the MFI is more dedicated to serving the poorer 
population at the bottom of pyramid (Hermes, Lensink, & Meesters, 2011; Mersland & Strøm, 2010). 
Both as disadvantaged groups, female borrowers and poorer borrowers share a lot of 
commonalities, and the arguments for the moderating effects of female borrowers can also apply to 
that of poorer borrowers. In particular, poorer borrowers are generally less educated, less skilled, and 
less productive, thus benefit less from the positive effects of globalization and suffer more from the 
negative effects of globalization. More specifically, social globalization reduces information 
asymmetry of the poor, and gives poor borrowers more financial and entrepreneurial knowledge. 
Consequently, MFIs will find these poor borrowers are less informationally opaque, and poor 
borrowers themselves become more financially literate and knowledgeable about loan clauses. All 
these give poor borrowers stronger bargaining power in relation to MFIs (Bruton et al., 2011; Yunus, 
2007). However, such benefits of social globalization are not likely to be enjoyed equally across 
different borrowers. Due to deficiencies in education, skills, and productivity, poorer borrowers may 
benefit less from such reduction brought by social globalization. In our context, poorer borrowers are 
those who borrow smaller amounts of loans, and MFIs which have lower average loan amount per 
borrower are those that are more dedicated to poorer borrowers. Therefore, while social globalization 
can help reduce MFIs’ interest rates, MFIs that are more dedicated to poorer borrowers (have lower 
average loan amount per borrower) will have a smaller interest rate cut as compared to other MFIs.  
 
14
Therefore,  
H3a. The amount of loans to the poor borrowers of the MFI positively moderates the 
relationship in H1a. 
Similarly, for economic globalization, increased international trade and investment leads to an 
increased income gap between the rich and the poor, and between the poor and the very poor at the 
bottom of the pyramid. This increases the risk of repayment and financial burden by the poorer 
borrowers relative to those less-poor entrepreneurs. On the MFIs’ side, higher risk of default makes 
MFIs more reluctant to grant loans with low interest rates to the poorer borrowers (Armendáriz de 
Aghion & Morduch, 2005). On the borrowers’ side, the lack of education, skills, and productivity 
usually makes poorer borrowers less competitive in obtaining limited resources, which further raises 
barriers for their access to finance (Morduch, 1999). All these factors result in poorer people having 
weaker bargaining power in relation to both MFIs and other less-poor borrowers in competing for 
limited funding. In other words, due to increased competition for limited resources brought by 
economic globalization, poorer borrowers are more likely to be deprived by the providers of financing 
and their competitors. Consequently, while economic globalization functions to raise MFIs’ interest 
rates, MFIs that are more dedicated to poorer borrowers (have lower average loan balance per 
borrower) will charge even higher interest rates to poorer borrowers, compared to other MFIs with 
higher average loan amount per borrower. Therefore, 
H3b. The amount of loans to the poor borrowers of the MFI negatively moderates the 
relationship in H1b.   
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Data and Sample  
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We empirically test the above hypotheses using a large and extensive panel with country- and 
organizational-level data. MFI’s organizational data were collected from the Microfinance Information 
Exchange, Inc. (MIX), which focuses on providing comprehensive, objective, and relevant 
information about microfinance providers and its data is used extensively in microfinance research 
(e.g., Armendariz de Aghion & Morduch, 2010; Sun & Im, 2015). One of the strong features of the 
MIX data is that the numbers are adjusted by international accounting standards (Cull, Demirguc-Kunt, 
& Morduch, 2009). In addition, the data provide not only financial information but also information on 
the proportion of female borrowers, as well as the legal status of MFIs and their target markets. While 
the MIX data is fairly comprehensive, it does not cover all MFIs that have ever existed. Therefore, 
potential concerns may exist regarding self-selection bias with the sample since MFIs voluntarily 
report information on their activities. However, the organizations that are included represent over 85% 
of global microfinance customers, and the data present leading MFIs activities with rigorous reporting 
standards (Cull et al., 2009; Krauss & Walter, 2009). Our sample covers 2,306 MFIs from 119 
emerging and developing countries around the world over the period 2002-2012. 
Data on globalization are from Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule (ETH) Zürich’s KOF 
Index of Globalization. The Social Globalization Index is constructed by (i) data on personal contact, 
including telephone traffic, transfers (percent of GDP), international tourism, foreign population 
(percent of total population), and international letters (per capita); (ii) data on information flows, 
including internet users (per 1000 people), television (per 1000 people), and trade in newspapers 
(percent of GDP); (iii) data on cultural proximity, including number of McDonald's Restaurants (per 
capita), Number of Ikea (per capita), and trade in books (percent of GDP). The Economic 
Globalization Index is constructed by (i) actual flows, including trade (percent of GDP), foreign direct  
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investment stocks (percent of GDP), portfolio investment (percent of GDP), and income payments to 
foreign nationals (percent of GDP); (ii) restrictions, including hidden import barriers, mean tariff rate, 
taxes on international trade (percent of current revenue), and capital account restrictions. Both indices 
are scaled to 0-100. Other country-level variables are from World Bank and World Governance 
Indicators. 
Empirical Strategy 
We apply a multi-level analysis approach in all our regressions. The multilevel quantitative 
models control for variations at different levels and intragroup correlations (e.g., time and country 
levels). Multilevel quantitative research has been widely applied in the field of international business 
(Hitt, Beamish, Jackson, & Mathieu, 2007; Peterson, Arregle, & Martin, 2012). Leveraging its 
advantage in modeling theoretical variables across different level, we build a three-level nested data 
structure in this study (Holcomb et al., 2010; Klein, Tosi, & Cannella, 1999; Peterson et al., 2012). 
Caudill et al. (2009) find that MFIs within a country could share similar regulation, borrowing culture, 
and economic environment. The same country could induce similar common practices of MFIs (Ahlin 
& Townsend, 2007). The issue of intra-class correlation may arise when the variations of the outcome 
variable at the micro level can be partially explained by explanatory variables at the macro level. For 
example, in our context, part of the variations in interest rate could be explained by the intra-year or 
intra-country differences in female borrower rate or average loan balance per borrower (Bliese and 
Ployhart, 2002). To avoid these cross-level biases, we differentiate three levels in our multilevel 
analysis: the first is at the time-level, i.e., within-MFI analysis over different time periods; the second 
is at the country-level, i.e., within-MFI analysis across different countries (especially for those 
multinational MFIs); the third is at the intra-country level, i.e., within-country analysis across different  
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MFIs. 
The dependent variable is the one-year forward average gross interests and fees on the focal 
MFI’s loan portfolio (winsorized at 1%). The focus on MFI’s average interest rate of its whole loan 
portfolio at the aggregated organizational level, rather than at the individual loan level, is because the 
later says little about MFIs’ social responsibility in cutting interest rate for all poor borrowers, but 
rather about individual borrowers’ capability. The key explanatory variables are country-level social 
globalization and economic globalization indices (KOF Index of Globalization). Another two key 
explanatory variables are (1) female borrower rate of the focal MFI, defined as the number of active 
female borrowers as a percentage of the total number of the MFI’s all active borrowers, and (2) 
average loan balance per borrower as a percentage of GNI per capita (lower value indicates more 
dedicated to poor borrowers, or deeper outreach to the poor borrowers). 
We also control for various country-level, market-level, and organizational-level covariates that 
are believed to affect MFI’s interest rates, which include whether the focal MFI is regulated by the 
government, the country-level “rule of law” which captures state fragility and institutional quality 
(Ault & Spicer, 2013), the size of the “borrower community” that measures the size of the country’s 
aggregate loan balance, the MFI’s years since establishment, the MFI’s debt-to-assets ratio, whether 
the MFI is registered as a non-profit institution, the MFI’s operating efficiency, administrative expense 
ratio, employee productivity of the focal MFI, the current legal status of the MFI, the scale of the 
MFI’s loan portfolio size, its target markets, and country-level GDP per capita. The detailed 
description of each variable is listed in the Appendix. 
The descriptive statistics of all our variables are shown in Table 1. The correlations between 
independent variables are shown in Table 2.  
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[Insert Tables 1 & 2 about Here] 
 
RESULTS 
In this section we show results from formal regressions. Column 1 of Table 4 presents the baseline 
results with only MFI and country characteristics (without globalization variables and their 
interactions). It is shown in Column 1 that the coefficient on the average loan balance per borrower is 
negative and statistically significant, i.e., the per-borrower loan balance on average is negatively 
correlated with average loan portfolio interest rate of the MFI, which implies that the less-poor 
borrowers can enjoy lower interest rates from the MFI, and potentially indicates that poorer borrowers 
face higher interest rates, or in other words, are more deprived from access to finance. Similarly, 
female borrower rate of the MFI is positively correlated with its average loan portfolio interest rate, 
supporting the argument that women are deprived from easier access to finance under institutional 
voids, thus MFI that are more dedicated to female borrowing on average charges higher interest rates 
to borrowers. 
In terms of other variables, lower gross nominal interest rates of MFI’s loan portfolio is 
associated with better regulations and better rule of law, which is consistent with the intuition that 
better domestic institutional environment provide better investor protection and helps lower access to 
finance (cost of borrowing). This holds not only in the formal economy but also in the informal sector. 
High employee productivity is associated with lower interest rate. Operating expenses raise interest 
rate, while leverage ratio (debt to assets ratio) reduces interest rate, and interest rates are lower for 
MFIs that are registered as “non-profit institutions”, which is consistent with the claimed mission of 
non-profit organizations.  
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Column 2 shows the results when globalization variables enter the regression. Given that the 
variables Social Globalization and Economic Globalization are both scaled from 0 to 100, they can be 
(roughly) interpreted as the degree of globalization of the country as a percentage. The coefficient on 
social globalization is negative and statistically significant at 0.1% level, which supports H1a, that 
social globalization can significantly reduce MFI's interest rate, thus the barrier to the poor’s access to 
finance. The economic significance is nontrivial: a one-standard-deviation increase in the degree 
(percentage) change of social globalization is associated with 0.1% reduction in MFI’s aggregate 
interest rate, which is remarkable for small-amount loans. In contrast, when Economic Globalization 
enters into the regression as in Column 3, the coefficient on Economic Globalization is positive and 
statistically significant at 1% level, with almost the same (slightly bigger) economic significance, 
which supports the prediction in H1b, that economic globalization can deprive borrowers from access 
to finance. 
Columns 4 and 5 further include the interaction terms between the organization-level female 
borrower rate and the country-level social globalization, and between female borrower rate and the 
country-level economic globalization, as well as their main effects. Column 4 shows that while the 
main effects of female borrower rate and social globalization still remains the same—negative 
coefficient on Social Globalization and positive coefficient on Female Borrower Rate—the coefficient 
of the interaction term “Social Globalization×Female Borrower Rate” is positive and statistically 
significant. This implies that female borrower rate negatively moderates the effect of social 
globalization on MFI’s interest rate. Put differently, the negative association between social 
globalization and MFI’s average loan portfolio interest rate is weaker when the MFI is more dedicated 
to female lending (the larger proportion of borrowers is women). In addition, Column 5 shows that the  
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coefficient of the interaction term “Economic Globalization×Female Borrower Rate” is also positive 
and statistically significant (while the main effect of Economic Globalization is positive). This should 
be interpreted that female borrower rate positively moderates the effect of economic globalization on 
MFI’s interest rate. In other words, the positive association between economic globalization and MFI’s 
average loan portfolio interest rate is stronger when the MFI is more dedicated to female lending. 
These results are consistent with the notion that less educated and less productive entrepreneurs 
benefit less from the “bright side” of globalization (social globalization reducing barrier of access to 
finance) and are deprived more by the “dark side” of globalization (economic globalization raising the 
barrier of access to finance). Therefore, our H2a and H2b are supported. 
Moving to Columns 6 and 7, we examine the moderating effects of MFI’s outreach to poorer 
borrowers. Now the interactions are between Social Globalization and Average Loan Balance per 
Borrower (Column 6), and between Economic Globalization and Average Loan Balance per Borrower 
(Column 7). The coefficient on “Social Globalization×Average Loan Balance per Borrower” in 
Column 6 is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level, which implies that lower average 
loan balance per borrower (deeper outreach to poor borrowers) makes the negative relation between 
social globalization and MFI’s interest rate weaker. Meanwhile, the coefficient on “Economic 
Globalization×Average Loan Balance per Borrower” in Column 7 is also negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level, indicating that deeper outreach to the poor borrowers further strengthens 
the positive relationship between economic globalization and MFI’s interest rate. Again, both 
moderating effects imply that poorer borrowers benefit less and are deprived more by globalization, 
which supports our H3a and H3b. 
[Insert Table 4 about Here]  
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Figure 1 graphically illustrates the moderating effects of female borrower rate and average loan 
balance per borrower on the effects of social and economic globalization on MFI’s average loan 
interest rate. The graphs confirm our empirical findings. In general, the slopes for social globalization 
are negative (Figures 1A and 1C), indicating that social globalization is negatively related to MFIs’ 
average interest rate, while the slopes for economic globalization are positive (Figures 1B and 1D), 
indicating that the association between economic globalization and MFIs’ interest rate is negative. 
Female borrower rates and poor borrowers (measured by average loan balance per borrower) also have 
strong moderating effects, as the slopes for higher female borrower rates and lower female borrower 
rates differ substantially in Figures 1A and 1B, and that for higher and lower average loan balance per 
borrower are also significantly different in Figures 1C and 1D. Overall, the heterogeneous effects of 
globalization and the moderating effects of disadvantageous borrower population are conspicuous on 
graphs.  
[Insert Figure 1 about Here] 
To check the robustness of the previous results, we have conducted several additional tests by 
including additional controls and using different estimation methods. One concern may be that the 
interest rate setting also depends on the width and depth of the borrower base, which may not be 
captured by our control variables. Therefore, we further include in our regressions two additional 
controls: MFI’s outreach (winsorized) and the country’s total population. In addition, given that our 
key variables of interest—social and economic globalizations—are at the country-level, one may 
worry about other alternative country-level channels that are related to globalization but also 
simultaneously affecting interest rate setting, such as culture and legal systems. We therefore also 
control for country fixed effects, and report the new results in Table 5. To preserve space we only  
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report the coefficients on the key explanatory variables, but the same control variables are included. As 
shown in Table 5, the previous results still survive: higher degree of social globalization is associated 
with lower loan portfolio interest rate, while female borrower rate and lower average loan balance per 
borrower negatively moderate such relationship. In contrast, higher degree of economic globalization 
is associated with higher interest rate, while female borrower rate and lower average loan balance per 
borrower positively moderate such relationship. 
[Insert Table 5 about Here] 
To explore the source of the heterogeneous effects of globalization, we go step further and 
investigate the effect of different components of social globalization and of economic globalization. 
This allows us to better understand which aspects of globalization contribute more to MFI’s interest 
rate setting. We therefore replace Social Globalization with its three main components (sub-indices) as 
mentioned in the Data and Methodology section: Personal Contact, Information Flows, and Cultural 
Proximity, and replace Economic Globalization with its two main components (sub-indices): Actual 
Flows and Restrictions (by construction, higher value of “Restrictions” indicates fewer trade 
restrictions; see variable description in Appendix). Several interesting observations emerge from Table 
6. First, the statistical significance of each individual component of Social Globalization and of 
Economic Globalization is smaller (sometimes even insignificant) than the aggregate social and 
economic globalization scores, indicating that the effects of globalization are complementary to each 
other, rather than substitutive. Second, the moderating effect of female borrower rate is stronger for the 
individual components of Economic Globalization (Actual Flows and Restrictions), but not for that of 
Social Globalization, as the coefficients on the interaction terms between Social Globalization and 
Personal Contact, Information Flows, and Cultural Proximity are not statistically significant. Third, the  
 
23
moderating effect of poorer borrowers (smaller average loan balance) is significant for Information 
Flows, Cultural Proximity, and Actual Flows, but not for Personal Contact and Restrictions, indicating 
there are differential interaction effects of different aspects of social and economic globalization with 
poor borrowers’ existing financial conditions on their future costs of borrowing (access to finance). 
[Insert Table 6 about Here] 
 
DISCUSSION 
Researchers and policymakers are increasingly paying attention to “inclusive growth”: advancing 
equitable opportunities for economic participants during the process of economic growth with benefits 
incurred by every section of society (Ianchovichina & Lundstrom, 2009). Inclusive growth not only 
advocates the growth of the formal economy which consists of large firms financed by capital markets, 
but also focuses on the development of informal economy which consists of informal firms, small 
entrepreneurs, and micro-credit granted to them so as to provide livelihood of billions of very poor at 
bottom of the pyramid, especially in developing countries (Prahalad, 2005). However, the informal 
economy, which hosts the world’s billions of low-income population, suffers most from institutional 
voids characterized by the lack of formal rules governing economic activities and market institutions 
facilitating transactions. Yet, how different players in this segment of the economy interact with 
institutions and institutional voids remain largely unexplored. In this paper, we examined a particular 
mechanism that emerges to overcome institutional voids in the informal economy: the microfinance 
institutions which provide access to finance to help the poor and small entrepreneurs. We examine 
how MFIs’ functioning (“social responsibility”) is influenced by globalization that embraces different 
types of institutions. We focus on the interest rate setting of MFIs as it is their main function and  
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social responsibility in helping the poor, as lower interest rates provide the poor and informal 
entrepreneurs with easier access to credit, and we focus on the economic and social aspects of 
globalization as they embrace confounding institutions.   
Using an extensive sample of organizational level data on MFIs from 119 developing and 
emerging countries, we find that globalization has heterogeneous effects on MFI’s interest rate setting 
(i.e. their social responsibility). In particular, social globalization that embraces egalitarian 
institutions—facilitating information flows, personal contact and cultural proximity—helps reduce 
MFI’s average portfolio loan interest rate, while economic globalization that embraces neoliberal 
institutions—facilitating competition in international trade, investment, and other capital flows as well 
as reduction of capital flow barriers—increases MFI’s average loan portfolio interest rate. In addition, 
MFI’s outreach to female borrowers and poorer borrowers—two most prominent missions of MFI’s 
social responsibility—negatively moderates the relation between social globalization and interest rate, 
and positively moderates the relation between economic globalization and interest rate. These indicate 
that the less educated and less productive population in informal economy benefit less from and are 
deprived more by new neoliberal-oriented institutions. 
Contributions to Understanding Multifaceted Effects of Globalization.     
In recent years, economists have realized the multifaceted effects of globalization around the 
world, though mostly at the country-level (Stiglitz, 2003; Rodrik, 2006). Relatively little is known 
about such heterogeneous effects of globalization at the organizational level, especially in the informal 
economy. Institutional voids of credit in developing and emerging economies provide us an 
opportunity to investigate such micro-level impact. As shown by our results, different facets of 
globalization do influence MFIs’ lending decision and poor borrowers’ access to finance differently.  
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Our findings therefore shed light on both the bright side and the dark side of globalization from the 
perspectives of how social organizations (MFIs) can serve the global poor. These organization-level 
findings, together with Mair, Marti, & Ventresca (2012) and Johnson & Kidder (1999), complement 
the country-level evidences to provide a more complete picture of globalization’s effects. 
The findings on the multifaceted effects of globalization also extend the scope of the study of 
business and poverty in general (e.g., Ault & Spicer, 2013), and have strong policy implication on the 
role of the informal economy in society. Our findings are consistent with the dual perspective of the 
informal economy (La Porta & Shleifer, 2014), and contradict ideas that suggest the benefits of 
neoliberal-based economic globalization that advances the formal sector will “trickle-down” to the 
informal sector to make the poor relieved from financial constraints. In fact, the spread of neoliberal 
policies may lead to greater competition and market ideology which result in higher cost of borrowing 
for the deprived poor population. In other words, stronger economic globalization seems to make it 
harder for MFIs to overcome institutional voids, as small entrepreneurs have less access to credit. 
Contributions to Understanding MFIs and Social Enterprises. 
The traditional views on how social enterprises such as MFIs balance their social missions with 
financial concerns are usually related to the costs associated with serving small loans, the potentially 
high delinquency rate, and the moral hazard caused by information asymmetry between lenders and 
borrowers without credit history or collateral (Cull et al., 2007; Hermes, Lensink, & Meesters, 2011; 
Sun & Im, 2015). However, this is far from a complete picture of social enterprises as a special 
organization type. Organization theories have long embraced the notion that organizations interact 
with their external environment and institutions that influence their behaviors. An organization’s 
environment also shapes how organizational members make sense of themselves and their  
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organization. Globalization as both social and economic forces that bring different types of institutions 
provides us an ideal ground to study how social enterprises interact with their dynamic environment. 
By empirically showing that MFIs’ interest rates are associated differently with different types of 
globalization, and that such effects are amplified by the presence of more disadvantaged borrowers, 
we provide strong evidence on the existence of such organization-environment interaction in the 
context of social enterprises, and further give insights to how such interaction functions under 
heterogeneous environment. 
Moreover, social enterprises that combine the organizational forms of both business and charity 
at their cores make them an attractive setting to study hybrid organizing, an important subject that 
remains largely unexplored in the literature (Battilana & Lee, 2014). Therefore, our empirical findings 
also contribute to the broader literature on hybrid organizing and organization by highlighting the 
importance of institutional contexts in shaping hybrid organizations strategies. Our conjecture that 
different institutions enacted by globalization galvanize different forms of hybrid 
organizations—social globalization strengthens the social (charity) function while economic 
globalization amplifies the business (profit) function—provides new insights on such institutional 
contexts of hybrid organizing. By understanding the social and economic forces that drive the 
behavior of MFIs as an important form of hybrid organization, we are thus better able understand the 
challenges contemporary MFIs (and hybrid organizations in general) face, and therefore offer better 
policy and management guidance. 
Finally our paper also has broader implications for corporations engaging in CSR by studying 
how organizations can be “doing good” while “doing well” in the formal sector. As globalization has 
heterogeneous effects on the provision of access to finance in informal economy, its effect on access to  
 
27
finance in the formal sector is an interesting but largely unanswered question. We believe our findings 
open a ground for more theoretical and empirical research to investigate the effects of globalization on 
multinational corporations—as on contrary to MFIs—in fulfilling their social responsibilities. 
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Table 1. Country Distribution of Microfinance Institutions
Country MFI-year observations Number of MFIs Country MFI-year observations Number of MFIs
Afghanistan 117  18 Malawi 59 9
Albania 62  6 Malaysia 5 1
Angola 11  2 Mali 131 21
Argentina 112  18 Mexico 434 76
Armenia 110  15 Moldova 33 5
Azerbaijan 203  27 Mongolia 58 9
Bangladesh 462  79 Montenegro 18 4
Belarus 4  1 Morocco 112 11
Belize 4  1 Mozambique 85 11
Benin 138  22 Myanmar 3 1
Bhutan 4  1 Namibia 11 2
Bolivia 279  28 Nepal 289 46
Bosnia and Herzegovina 179  17 Nicaragua 278 34
Brazil 186  40 Niger 46 8
Bulgaria 169  25 Nigeria 230 71
Burkina Faso  64  15 Pakistan 232 33
Burundi 28  6 Palestine 69 8
Cambodia 184  18 Panama 29 5
Cameroon 128  27 Papua New Guinea  16 2
Central African Republ 7  1 Paraguay 66 7
Chad 16  3 Peru 616 70
Chile 40  7 Philippines 677 108
China 215  67 Poland 21 4
Colombia 267  39 Republic of the Congo3 0 5
Comoros 3  3 Romania 64 8
Costa Rica  114  17 Russia 416 103
Croatia 17  2 Rwanda 63 11
Democratic Republic of  82  22 Saint Lucia 2 1
Dominican Republic 86  13 Samoa 13 1
Ecuador 483  58 Senegal 144 26
Egypt 124  16 Serbia 46 4
El Salvador  135  18 Sierra Leone 49 13 
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Ethiopia 177  23 Slovakia 3 1
Fiji 4  1 South  Africa 70 17
Gabon 3  1 South  Sudan 14 4
Gambia 11  2 Sri  Lanka 156 27
Georgia 109  16 Sudan 11 2
Ghana 284  77 Suriname 5 3
Grenada 4  2 Swaziland 9 1
Guatemala 167  23 Syria 19 3
Guinea 43  8 Tajikistan 229 44
Guinea-Bissau 12  4 Tanzania 115 16
Haiti 67  9 Thailand 14 3
Honduras 179  23 Timor-Leste 20 3
Hungary 4  1 Togo9 8 1 6
India 952  188 Tonga3 1
Indonesia  335  74 Trinidad and Tobago 11 2
Iraq 61  12 Tunisia 13 1
Ivory Coast  79  23 Turkey 13 2
Jamaica 11  3 Uganda 166 29
Jordan 84  8 Ukraine 25 3
Kazakhstan 200  43 Uruguay 72
Kenya 208  33 Uzbekistan 134 34
Kosovo 99  12 Vanuatu 2 1
Kyrgyzstan 220  46 Venezuela 16 2
Laos 33  20 Vietnam 153 35
Lebanon 41  5 Yemen 48 9
Liberia 11  3 Zambia 48 9
Macedonia 40  4 Zimbabwe 27 7
Madagascar 110  15 Total  
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs  Mean  Median  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Interest rate of MFI loan portfolio (winsor.)  7217  0.334  0.290  0.181  0.059  1.003 
Social  globalization  12519  37.330 37.790 11.636 15.190 82.060 
Economic  globalization  11833  53.400 53.320 12.310 25.690 89.620 
Regulated  MFI  12942  0.598 1  0.490 0  1 
Rule  of  Law  13333 -0.628 -0.600 0.447  -2.230 1.370 
Borrower  Community  11556  0.024 0.014 0.031 0  0.162 
MFI  age  13355  9.013 9  3.830 0  17 
Average loan balance/ GNI per capita (%)  10553  0.869  0.305  5.031  0  419.623 
Female  borrower  rate  9850  0.650 0.650 0.284 0  6.689 
Debt-to-asset  ratio  12540  0.639 0.735 1.454 -155.066  19.353 
Non-profit  MFI  12783  0.604 1  0.489 0  1 
Operational  Efficiency  9563  0.311 0.196 0.584 -0.060  22.180 
Administrative  Expenses  7197  0.086 0.064 0.088 -0.066  1.927 
Employee Productivity  11605  131.220  100  208.050  0  13709 
Ln(GDP  per  capita)  12796  7.287 7.185 1.059 4.522 9.955  
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Table 3. Correlation Matrix of Key Independent Variables 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14) 
( 1 )   S o c i a l   G l o b a l i z a t i o n   1 . 0 0 0 0                
(2)  Economic  Globalization  0.5977  1.0000              
(3)  Regulated  MFI  -0.2147  -0.0698  1.0000             
(4)  Rule  of  Law  0.3199  0.2051  -0.0705  1.0000            
(5)  Borrower  Community  -0.1230  0.1315  -0.0159  -0.2236  1.0000           
(6)  MFI  Age  -0.1031  -0.1104  -0.0746  -0.0199  0.3523  1.0000          
(7)  Average  Loan  Balance  -0.0613  0.0330  0.1883  -0.1281  -0.0035  -0.0758  1.0000         
(8)  Female  Borrower  Rate  -0.2287  -0.2367  -0.1909  0.0516  0.0753  0.1646  -0.3256  1.0000        
(9)  Debt-to-asset  Ratio  -0.1997  -0.2128  0.1791 -0.0518  0.1042 0.2141 0.0473 -0.0001  1.0000          
(10)  Non-profit  MFI  0.1101  -0.0213 -0.4709 0.0248  0.0659  -0.0001 -0.1038 0.1260  -0.1443 1.0000         
(11)  Operational  Efficiency  -0.0113 0.0060  -0.1005 0.0204  -0.1274 -0.1121 -0.1101 0.1109  -0.1224 -0.0084 1.0000       
(12)  Administrative  Expenses  0.0058  0.0511  -0.1223 0.0101  -0.1671 -0.1666 -0.1315 0.1231  -0.1034 -0.0240 0.6402  1.0000     
(13)  Employee  Productivity  -0.1108 -0.1539 0.0169  0.1100  -0.0270 0.0341  -0.1731 0.1856  0.0418  -0.0001 -0.0275 -0.0254 1.0000   
(14)  Ln(GDP  per  capita)  0.7724 0.5694 -0.2702  0.2946 0.0270 0.1085 -0.1722  -0.1750  -0.1357  0.0546 0.0401 0.0528 -0.0697  1.0000 
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Table 4. Regression Results: Globalization and Microfinance Interest Rates 
DV = MFI’s portfolio interest rate (winsor.)  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Regulated MFI  -0.0237
*** -0.0242
*** -0.0250
*** -0.0248
*** -0.0234
*** -0.0253
*** -0.0248
*** -0.0236
*** 
  (0.0051)  (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0053) 
Rule of Law  -0.0286
* -0.0218  -0.0368
* -0.0361
* -0.0361
* -0.0376
* -0.0387
* -0.0372
* 
  (0.0140)  (0.0150) (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0155) 
Borrower Community  -0.266  -0.362
* -0.417
* -0.419
* -0.424
* -0.429
* -0.422
* -0.432
* 
  (0.168)  (0.172) (0.168) (0.168) (0.168) (0.168) (0.168) (0.168) 
MFI  Age  0.00248  0.00300 0.00394  0.0042  0.00434 0.00415  0.0043  0.0045 
  (0.00383) (0.00395)  (0.00397) (0.0040) (0.00398)  (0.00396) (0.0040)  (0.0040) 
Average Loan Balance  -0.00625
** -0.00552
** -0.0144
*** -0.0141
*** -0.0142
*** -0.000195  0.0156  0.0014 
(scaled by GNI per capita)  (0.00204)  (0.00204)  (0.00307)  (0.0031)  (0.00307)  (0.00689)  (0.0115)  (0.0120) 
Female Borrower Rate  0.0926
*** 0.0886
*** 0.0798
*** 0.0009 -0.0933
* 0.0785
*** 0.0793
*** -0.0781
+ 
  (0.00883) (0.00894)  (0.00902) (0.0298)  (0.0375) (0.00903)  (0.00901) (0.0403) 
Debt-to-asset Ratio  -0.0203
** -0.0290
*** -0.0292
*** -0.0290
*** -0.0271
*** -0.0303
*** -0.0299
*** -0.0280
*** 
  (0.00744)  (0.00759) (0.00773) (0.00772) (0.00772) (0.00774) (0.00773)  (0.0077) 
Non-profit MFI  -0.0326
*** -0.0240
*** -0.0203
** -0.0213
** -0.0194
** -0.0209
** -0.0201
** -0.0197
** 
  (0.00657) (0.00678)  (0.00701) (0.0070) (0.00699)  (0.00701)  (0.00700) (0.0070) 
Operational Efficiency  0.0871
*** 0.0822
*** 0.0817
*** 0.0821
*** 0.0813
*** 0.0822
*** 0.0821
*** 0.0816
*** 
  (0.00933)  (0.00940) (0.00944) (0.00943) (0.00941) (0.00944) (0.00943)  (0.0094) 
Administrative Expense  0.327
*** 0.341
*** 0.378
*** 0.373
*** 0.372
*** 0.376
*** 0.375
*** 0.371
*** 
  (0.0366)  (0.0371) (0.0379) (0.0379) (0.0378) (0.0379) (0.0379) (0.0379) 
Employee Productivity  -0.0001
*** -0.0001
*** -0.0001
*** -0.0001
*** -0.0001
*** -0.0001
*** -0.0001
*** -0.0001
*** 
  (0.00001)  (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
Ln(GDP  per  capita)  -0.0051 0.0175 0.0113 0.0114 0.0128 0.0110 0.0111 0.0125 
  (0.0084)  (0.0116) (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0118)  
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Social Globalization (H1a)    -0.0027
** -0.0037
*** -0.0049
*** -0.0037
*** -0.0034
** -0.0036
*** -0.0034
** 
   (0.0010)  (0.0011)  (0.0012)  (0.0011)  (0.0011)  (0.0011)  (0.0012) 
Economic globalization (H1b)      0.0030
** 0.0030
** 0.0010 0.0031
** 0.0034
** 0.0012 
      (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0012) 
Social Globalization          0.0020
**      -0.0002 
 Female Borrower Rate (H2a)       (0.0007)      (0.0009) 
Economic Globalization            0.0032
***    0.0030
*** 
 Female Borrower Rate (H2b)        (0.0007)     (0.0008) 
Social  Globalization  (H3a)         -0.0004
*  -0.0002 
 Average Loan Balance (H3a)         (0.0002)    (0.0002) 
Economic  Globalization          -0.0005
** -0.0001 
 Average Loan Balance (H3b)          (0.0002)  (0.0003) 
MFIs Legal Status 
MFIs Size 
MFIs Age 
Controlled 
Controlled 
Controlled 
Controlled 
Controlled 
Controlled 
Controlled 
Controlled 
Controlled 
Controlled 
Controlled 
Controlled 
Controlled 
Controlled 
Controlled 
Controlled 
Controlled 
Controlled 
Controlled 
Controlled 
Controlled 
Controlled 
Controlled 
Controlled 
MFIs Target Market 
Financial Intermediation Types 
Year Effects 
Controlled 
Controlled 
Controlled 
Controlled 
Controlled 
Controlled 
Controlled 
Controlled 
Controlled 
Controlled 
Controlled 
Controlled 
Controlled 
Controlled 
Controlled 
Controlled 
Controlled 
Controlled 
Controlled 
Controlled 
Controlled 
Controlled 
Controlled 
Controlled 
Constant 0.259
** 0.204
* 0.120 0.166
+ 0.215
* 0.108 0.0936  0.193
* 
  (0.0817)  (0.0874) (0.0917) (0.0935) (0.0940) (0.0918) (0.0922) (0.0955) 
N  4357  4152 3950 3950 3950 3950 3950 3950 
Country N  101 92 83 83 83 83 83 83 
Log  likelihood  3697.1336  3549.3572 3476.0614 3479.9057 3487.3539  3478.731  3479.7437 3488.8176 
Wald  chi2  1985.41  1961.92 2000.42 2011.10 2033.45 2008.69 2011.50 2038.12 
Standard errors in parentheses; 
+ p < 0.1, 
* p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001  
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Table 5. Robustness Checks: Country Fixed Effects 
DV = MFI’s portfolio interest rate 
(winsor.) 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) 
Social Globalization  -0.0213***    -0.0202***   
  (0.0033)  (0.0032)   
Economic Globalization    0.0336**    0.0362** 
   (0.0123)    (0.0124) 
Female Borrower Rate  0.0284 -0.0945* 0.0860***  0.0782***
 (0.0296)  (0.0396)  (0.0095)  (0.0095) 
Average Loan Balance  -0.0056*  -0.0189***  0.0057  0.0066 
(scaled by GNI per capita)  (0.0022)  (0.0037)  (0.0046)  (0.0117) 
Social Globalization    0.0015*      
 Female Borrower Rate  (0.0007)      
Economic Globalization     0.0032***    
 Female Borrower Rate   (0.0007)    
Social Globalization        -0.0004**   
 Average Loan Balance       (0.0046)   
Economic Globalization        -0.0005* 
 Average Loan Balance      (0.0002) 
Other Control Variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Log Likelihood  3244.824  3183.1431  3246.5601  3175.7841 
N 3499  3330  3499  3330 
Standard errors in parentheses; 
+ p < 0.1, 
* p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001 
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Table 6. Robustness Checks: Sub-indices of Globalization 
DV = MFI’s portfolio interest rate 
(winsor.) 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
Personal  Contact  -0.00201*         -0.00166+      
(Social Globalization)  (0.000947)        (0.000886)        
Information  Flows    -0.00191*        -0.00127     
(Social Globalization)    (0.0009)        (0.000867)     
Cultural  Proximity     -0.0013*       -0.000905    
(Social Globalization)     (0.0007)       (0.000626)    
Actual  Flows       -0.0005       0.00168*   
(Economic Globalization)   (0.0009) (0.000807)  
Restrictions         0.0005       0.00201+ 
(Economic Globalization)         (0.0011)       (0.00103) 
Female  Borrower  Rate  0.0701**  0.0424  0.0779*** -0.0573+  -0.0330  0.0923*** 0.0838*** 0.0865*** 0.0842*** 0.0769*** 
  (0.0238)  (0.0325)  (0.0147)  (0.0332)  (0.0356)  (0.00951) (0.00961) (0.00958) (0.00943) (0.00973) 
Average Loan Balance  -0.0060**  -0.0057*  -0.0057*  -0.0064**  -0.0187***  -0.00649  0.00694  -0.00396+  0.0129+  -0.00127 
(scaled by GNI per capita)  (0.0022)  (0.00221)  (0.0022)  (0.0022)  (0.0038)  (0.00643) (0.00654) (0.00228) (0.00675)  (0.0118) 
Social Globalization    0.0006  0.0008  0.0004         
 Female Borrower Rate  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0004)         
Economic Globalization     0.0027*** 0.0020**   
 Female Borrower Rate       (0.0006)  (0.0006)       
Social Globalization              0.0000124  -0.000261*  -0.0004***     
 Average Loan Balance              (0.000166) (0.000127) (0.000106)     
Economic  Globalization             -0.0004**  -0.000334 
 Average Loan Balance             (0.000133)  (0.000209) 
Other  Control  Variables  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  Effects  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log  likelihood  3056.749 3046.398  3048.4438  3092.0297 2959.402 3056.2362 3047.566 3053.7391  3086.7659  2955.4524 
N  3475 3426  3499  3467 3292 3475 3426 3499 3467 3292 
Standard errors in parentheses; 
+ p < 0.1, 
* p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001 
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A. Moderating Effects of Female Borrower Rate on Social Globalization  B. Moderating Effects of Female Borrower Rate on Economic Globalization 
C. Moderating Effects of Poor Borrowers on Social Globalization  D. Moderating Effects of Poor Borrowers on Economic Globalization 
Figure 1. The Moderating Effects of Female Borrower Rate and Poor Borrowers on Globalization and MFI’s Interest Rate 
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Appendix. Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Name  Description  Data Source 
MFI Interest Rate  Interest and Fees on Loan Portfolio/ Loan Portfolio, gross, winsorized at 
1%.  MIX 
Social Globalization 
Expressed as the spread of ideas, information, images and people. The 
KOF index classifies social globalization in three categories. The first 
covers personal contacts, the second includes data on information flows 
and the third measures cultural proximity. Scale: 1-100. 
ETH KOF 
Index of 
Globalization 
Personal Contact 
(Social Globalization) 
This index is meant to capture direct interaction among people living in 
different countries. It includes international telecom traffic (traffic in 
minutes per person) and the degree of tourism (incoming and outgoing) a 
country’s population is exposed to. Government and workers’ transfers 
received and paid (in percent of GDP) measure whether and to what extent 
countries interact, while the stock of foreign population is included to 
capture existing interactions with people from other countries. The number 
of international letters sent and received also measure direct interaction 
among people living in different countries. Telecom traffic is provided by 
the International Telecommunication Union (2013), while the number of 
letters is taken from the Universal Postal Union’s Postal Statistics 
Database. The remaining three variables are from the World Bank (2014). 
Scale: 1-100. 
ETH KOF 
Index of 
Globalization 
Information flows 
(Social Globalization) 
The sub-index on information flows is meant to measure the potential flow 
of ideas and images. It includes the number of internet users (per 100 
people), the share of households with a television set, and international 
newspapers traded (in percent of GDP). All these variables to some extent 
proxy people’s potential for receiving news from other countries – they 
thus contribute to the global spread of ideas. The variables in this 
sub-index derive from the World Bank (2014), International 
Telecommunication Union (2013), the UNESCO (various years), and the 
United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (2013). Scale: 
1-100. 
ETH KOF 
Index of 
Globalization 
Cultural proximity 
(Social Globalization) 
Cultural proximity is arguably the dimension of globalization most 
difficult to grasp. Dreher (2006) suggests the number of English songs in 
national hit lists or movies shown in national cinemas that originated in 
Hollywood. However, these data lack for the majority of countries in our 
sample. Instead, we thus use imported and exported books (relative to 
GDP), as suggested in Kluver and Fu (2004). Traded books proxy the 
extent to which beliefs and values move across national borders, taken 
from the UNESCO (various years), and the United Nations Commodity 
Trade Statistics Database (2013). According to Saich (2000, p.209) 
moreover, cultural globalization mostly refers to the domination of U.S. 
cultural products. Arguably, the United States is the trend-setter in much of 
the global socio-cultural realm (see Rosendorf, 2000, p.111). As an 
additional proxy for cultural proximity we thus include the number of 
McDonald’s restaurants located in a country. For many people, the global 
spread of McDonald’s became a synonym for globalization itself. In a 
similar vein, we also use the number of Ikea per country. Scale: 1-100. 
ETH KOF 
Index of 
Globalization 
Economic 
Globalization 
Characterized as long distance flows of goods, capital and services as well 
as information and perceptions that accompany market exchanges. 
Broadly speaking, economic globalization has two dimensions. First, 
actual economic flows are usually taken to be measures of globalization. 
Consequently, two indices on restrictions to trade and capital are 
constructed that include individual components suggested as proxies for 
globalization in the previous literature. Scale: 1-100. 
ETH KOF 
Index of 
Globalization 
Actual Flows 
(Economic 
Globalization) 
The sub-index on actual economic flows includes data on trade, FDI and 
portfolio investment. Data on trade are provided by the World Bank 
(2014), stocks of FDI (normalized by GDP) are provided by UNCTAD 
STAT (2013). Portfolio investment is derived from the IMF’s International 
ETH KOF 
Index of 
Globalization  
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Financial Statistics (January 2014). More specifically, trade is the sum of a 
country’s exports and imports and portfolio investment is the sum of a 
country’s stock of assets and liabilities (all normalized by GDP). While 
these variables are straightforward, income payments to foreign nationals 
and capital are included to proxy for the extent that a country employs 
foreign people and capital in its production processes. Scale: 1-100. 
Restrictions 
(Economic 
Globalization) 
The Restrictions index refers to restrictions on trade and capital using 
hidden import barriers, mean tariff rates, taxes on international trade (as a 
share of current revenue) and an index of capital controls. Given a certain 
level of trade, a country with higher revenues from tariffs is less 
globalized. To proxy restrictions of the capital account, an index based on 
data by Gwartney et al. (2013) is employed. This index is based on the 
IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions and includes 13 different types of capital controls. The index 
is constructed by subtracting the number of restrictions from 13 and 
multiplying the result by 10. The indices on mean tariff rates and hidden 
import barriers are also derived from Gwartney et al. (2013). Mean tariff 
rates originate from various sources. Gwartney et al. allocated a rating of 
10 to countries that do not impose any tariffs. As the mean tariff rate 
increases, countries are assigned lower ratings. The rating will decline 
toward zero as the mean tariff rate approaches 50 percent (which is usually 
not exceeded by most countries among their sample). The original source 
for hidden import barriers, finally, is the World Economic Forum’s Global 
Competitiveness Report (various issues). Scale: 1-100. 
ETH KOF 
Index of 
Globalization 
Regulated MFI    A dummy variable measured whether MFIs are regulated by a government 
or not.  MIX 
Borrower Community 
The accumulated number of individuals or entities who currently have an 
outstanding loan balance with the MFIs in the focal country, adjusted by 
country population, log- transformed. 
MIX 
Average Loan Balance  Average Loan Balance per Borrower/ GNI per capita.  MIX
Female Borrowers  The ratio of the number of active female borrowers to the total number of 
active borrowers (%).  MIX 
Debt-to-asset Ratio  The ratio of the focal MFI’s total debts to total assets.  MIX
Non-Profit MFI  Focal MFI registered as a non-profit organization.  MIX
Operational Efficiency    Operating Expense / Loan Portfolio.  MIX
Administrative Expense  (Administrative Expense + Depreciation)/ Assets, average.  MIX
Employee Productivity    Borrowers per staff, measured as the ratio of the number of active 
borrowers to the number of focal MFI’s staff members.  MIX 
MFIs Legal Status  Categorical variable: registered as bank; Credit Union, NBFI, Rural bank, 
and Others.  MIX 
MFI Size    Categorical variable for loan portfolio: Large, Medium, and Small scale of 
gross loan portfolio.  MIX 
MFI Target Market    Categorical variable: Target market: low end; Broad; High end, and Small 
business.  MIX 
MFI Age  Categorical variable: New (1-4 years); Young (5-8 years), ad Mature 
(more than 8 years).  MIX 
Financial 
Intermediation Types 
Categorical variable: Non FI (No voluntary savings); Low FI (Voluntary 
savings < 20% of total assets); High FI (Voluntary savings >= 20% of total 
assets). 
MIX 
GDP Per Capita  Total GDP is divided by the resident population on a country, 
log-transformed. 
World Bank 
 
Rule of Law 
perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of 
crime and violence. 
World Bank 
 
 
 